EU: Change Rules on Debts and Deficits, Don’t Bend Them?

John Bruton writes:  Change the EU treaty rules on debts and deficits, but don’t bend them.

The European Union (EU) is a group of sovereign states, each entirely free to leave the EU. There is no coercive force to make Britain or any other country remain in the union. Britain enjoys a freedom, within the EU, that colonies did not enjoy within the British or other European empires. Britain is, therefore, entirely within its rights in considering the option of leaving the EU.

The EU does not exist on the basis of coercion. It exists on the basis of common rules or treaties that EU members have so far freely abided by, even when particular decisions were not to their liking. If countries started systematically ignoring EU decisions, the union would  soon disappear.

One particularly important set of EU rules are the ones that apply to budget deficits and debts of EU countries within the eurozone. These rules have been incorporated in EU treaties and in treaties between euro area states. One provision is that if a country has an excessive deficit, it must reduce that by an amount equivalent to 0.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) each year until it reaches a deficit below 3%.

France and Italy, big states that were founding members of the EU, have both produced budgets for 2015 that do not comply with the rules.  Some will argue it’s the rules that are at fault, not France and Italy. Inflation is negative, so debts increase in value while prices fall.

Countries are caught in a debt deflation trap of a kind that was not envisaged when the rules were drawn up. But that is an argument for changing the rules, not an argument for ignoring them or pretending they have been complied with, when they haven’t.

Changing the rules would require EU treaty change, and nobody wants to change the treaties, because such a move would have to be unanimously agreed upon by all 28 EU states. Other EU members fear that would be an opportunity for Britain to use the lever of blocking a treaty change to revise the fiscal rules as a means of getting a concession of British demands for: a restriction of free movement of people within the EU; vetoes for a minority of national parliaments on EU legislation; and the scrapping of the “ever closer union” within the EU.

If the EU is unable to change its treaties the union will eventually die. Daniel Gros, of the Centre for European Policy Studies, criticized the European Commission of Jean Claude Juncker for failing to either insist that France and Italy stick by the existing fiscal rules or, if not, call for a revision of the rules to take account of the exceptional deflationary conditions that exist.

Don’t bend the rules.  Change them.

The Price of European Union

Finland Struggles

Russian sanctions have hit Finland hard, but this is not the country’s only problem.

Economically, the bigger problem is the longer-term slow-down that the global economy faces. This affects Finland, the eurozone and Russia. In addition, the Finnish economy is in the middle of a severe structural change, as employment is decreasing in the traditional wood-processing, paper and heavy industry sectors. Surprisingly, employment is also decreasing in certain service sector areas, such as banking. The situation has further deteriorated because of the ageing population of Finland. This poses a triple challenge to our economy and growth prospects. Russia and sanctions are not our main economic concern.

Finland is a country that ranks high on all indices of transparency, lack of corruption and press freedom.  Are its problems an indication of what is in store for other aging economies?

Here is a trenchant interview of Finland/’s former finance minister, Jutta Urpalainen by a prominent Iranian journalist, Kourosh Zibari.  Finland

Finland

Corruption as a Component of Piketty’s Formula?

Moises Naim writes:  The profound impact of Piketty’s book Capital is largely a result of the fact that it was published at a time when growing economic inequality has become an American preoccupation. Since the United States has proven so adept at globalizing its anxieties and exporting its policy debates, the Piketty phenomenon is extending to places where inequality has been pervasive for so long that the public seemed inured to it and resigned to passively accept it. Now, members of many of these societies are actively debating how to bring inequality down.

In order for this discussion to be valuable, however, the problem requires a more complete diagnosis. It is not accurate to assert that in countries like Russia, Nigeria, Brazil, and China, the main driver of economic inequality is a rate of return on capital that is larger than the rate of economic growth. A more holistic explanation would need to include the massive fortunes regularly created by corruption and all kinds of illicit activities. In many countries, wealth grows more as a result of thievery and malfeasance than as a consequence of the returns on capital invested by elites (a factor that is surely at work too).

Corruption-fueled inequality flourishes where there are no incentives to hinder it.
To channel Piketty, inequality will continue to rise in societies where “c > h.” Here, “c” stands for the degree to which corrupt politicians and public employees, along with their private-sector cronies, break laws for personal gain, and “h” represents the degree to which honest politicians and public employees uphold fair governing practices. Corruption-fueled inequality flourishes in societies where there are no incentives, rules, or institutions to hinder corruption. And having honest people in government is good, but not enough. The practices of pilfering public funds or selling government contracts to the highest bidder must be seen as risky, routinely detected, and systematically punished.

Most of the roughly 20 nations from which Piketty forms his analysis classify as high-income countries and rank among the least-corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. Unfortunately, most of humanity lives in countries where “c > h” and dishonesty is the primary driver of inequality. This point has not attracted as much attention as Piketty’s thesis. But it should.

 The Prospect of Reform in China by Claudi Munoz

Can Japan Tackle Its Economic Problems Without a Crisis?

Was Japan’s economy waiting for a Crisis.  Wharton School of Business’s online journal thinks so. Most Japan watchers and economists, and even Abe himself, say that to restore sustainable growth, Japan needs sweeping deregulation and structural reforms to cope with its growing public debt and its declining and aging population. But pushing through such changes is proving daunting, despite Abe’s pledges to “drill deep into the bedrock” of Japan’s vested interests.

Allen says there is an issue of long-term fiscal sustainability for Japan and this is part of the risk. “At some point, there will be a significant problem in the form of capital flight from Japan. Whether postponing [the sales tax hike] two years will trigger that or not — I don’t know. There’s some chance of it, but probably it won’t make too much difference,” Allen notes. Eventually, though, Japan must tackle its debt situation. “The problem is they can’t keep on borrowing,” he points out. “It’s a question of what one thinks the short-term versus the long-term effects are. The long-term effects at some point will catch up with them — but it could take a long time. This is why it’s such a tricky issue.”

Given the slow pace at which Japan has been tackling reforms needed to catalyze new industries, promote innovation and increase productivity, Japan may end up facing a fiscal crisis before any drastic action is taken, says Allen. Abenomics is no panacea, he adds. “The issue with long-term fiscal sustainability is Japan is potentially heading for some massive crisis. Maybe that will solve everything for it, but it is also likely to be extremely disruptive and politically dangerous.”    Does the Japanese Economy Need a Crisis

Merkel and Abe

What’s In Qaboos’ Caboose?

Giorgio Caifero writes: Tumbling oil prices are upsetting political equations all over the globe, especially for governments that depend heavily on oil revenue to provide services for their populations.  Governments in the oil-rich Middle East are also being forced to tighten their belts.

The slide in oil prices has hit the Sultanate of Oman. The sultanate’s vulnerability was underscored late last year when Standard & Poor’s cut its outlook for Oman’s sovereign rating from stable to negative.  Last month, the economic and financial committee for the lower house of the Majlis al-Shura (Oman’s legislative body) proposed a ‘fair tax’ on liquefied natural gas exports, estimated to generate $509 million. The Majlis al-Shura has also approved legislation to impose a 2 % tax on goods the Oman’s 1.9 million expatriates send overseas.  The Majlis al-Shura also proposed a 12% levy on telecommunications revenue, which Oman News Agency reports would bring in $80.5 million. Meanwhile Oman Cement and Raysut Cement announced that the Ministry of Oil and Gas would double the priceof natural gas for the two firms.. State spending in health, housing and training will remain the same.

Oman’s unique stability is largely attributed to the state’s high domestic spending, making budget cuts a politically risky solution to the shortfall in oil revenue.  Oman’s ability to increase government services in times of unrest has been a crucial lifeline for the monarchy in the recent past.

After the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt stepped down under public pressure, Omani youths held demonstrations idemanding political and economic reform.

Sultan Qaboos bin Said ordered the government to create 50,000 jobs and pay every job-seeker $386 each month.  Omani protesters demanding reform actually pledged allegiance to Qaboos, showing their support for the monarchical system while demanding changes within it.

Throughout the Arab Spring, Qaboos has maintained a degree of popularity enjoyed by no other Middle Eastern leader of the 21st century. Oman’s monarchical political system has not democratized, and power remains staunchly in Qaboos’ hands. Observers conclude that as a rentier state, the government has been successful in quelling the citizenry’s democratic aspirations in exchange for material benefits.

At this juncture, the Omani government’s challenge is to maintain this unwritten agreement with its citizens as sliding oil prices create new fiscal pressures.

Oman’s crude oil reserves are expected to deplete far sooner than those of neighboring Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, putting greater pressure on Oman to increase the role of non-oil sectors in its economy. The sultanate’s unique stability will be tested if future economic reform triggers unrest and the government lacks the lifeline it used before.

Qaboos of Oman

Inadequate Banking Facilities Hamper Business in Burma

Burma’s business development prospects in 2015 are forecast to be mixed as the country grapples with a variety of problems ranging from domestic political uncertainty to outside economic influences beyond its control.

National elections this year will make some foreign investors hesitant to enter Burma until a clear outcome emerges, say analysts, and the unexpected collapse of oil prices in 2014 is likely to put plans to develop 20 offshore oil and gas blocks into slow gear.

Some major infrastructure investment decisions, notably the special economic zone at Dawei on the southeast coast, are anticipated, but not soon.  Economic reform must be a continuing key issue for Burma’s leadership if the country is to follow its neighbors and integrate further with the international community.

Major obstacles to economic expansion in Burma in 2015 are the country’s inadequate banking and finance facilities plus rampant corruption at all levels.

This first quarter of 2015 should see the announcement of more final agreements in production sharing contracts (PSCs) between the state-owned Myanma Oil & Gas Enterprise and the foreign oil companies who won licenses to explore 20 sites in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea for oil and gas.

Terms for investment and potential profit sharing have been complicated by the collapse of international crude oil prices over the last six months.

Major oil companies that won offshore licenses for Burma in March include Shell, Chevron, Total and ConocoPhillips.  The national oil companies (NOCs) of neighbors Malaysia and Thailand, which have projects in Burma, have already announced expenditure cuts.

The continued lack of a deep-water port for Rangoon threatens to undermine manufacturing growth in Burma’s biggest city which is also the main commercial sea gateway into the country.

The Dawei port is located approximately 700 kilometers from Rangoon.  Critics of the Dawei SEZ have said it would primarily benefit Thailand by giving it access to the Indian Ocean as an oil transhipment terminal, and to expand its petrochemical industries, which are stymied in the greater Bangkok region by environmental laws.

Business in Burma

 

Carbon Taxes?

The case for carbon taxes has long been compelling. With the recent steep fall in oil prices and associated declines in other energy prices, it has become overwhelming. There is room for debate about the size of the tax and about how the proceeds should be deployed. But there should be no doubt that, given the current zero tax rate on carbon, increased taxation would be desirable.

The core of the case for taxation is the recognition that those who use carbon-based fuels or products do not bear all the costs of their actions. Carbon emissions exacerbate global climate change. In many cases, they contribute to local pollution problems that harm human health. Getting fossil fuels out of the ground involves both accident risks and environmental challenges. And even with the substantial recent increases in U.S. oil production, we remain a net importer. Any increase in our consumption raises our dependence on Middle East producers.

All of us, when we drive our cars, heat our homes or use fossil fuels in more indirect ways, create these costs without paying for them. It follows that we overuse these fuels. Advocating a carbon tax is not some kind of argument for government planning; it is the logic of the market: That which is not paid for is overused. Even if the government had no need or use for revenue, it could make the economy function better by levying carbon taxes and rebating the money to taxpayers.

While the recent decline in energy prices is a good thing in that it has, on balance, raised the incomes of Americans, it has also exacerbated the problem of energy overuse.

Would a carbon tax place an unfair burden on some middle- and low-income consumers?  Those who drive long distances to work, say, or who have homes that are expensive to heat would be disproportionately burdened. Now that these consumers have received a windfall from the fall in energy prices, it would be possible to impose substantial carbon taxes without them being burdened relative to where things stood six months ago.

Could taxing fossil fuels will hurt the competitiveness of U.S. industry and encourage offshoring?   A well-designed tax would be levied on the carbon content of all imports coming from countries that did not impose their own carbon levies.

What size levy is appropriate? Here there is more danger of doing too little than too much. Once the principle of taxation is accepted, its level can be adjusted. A tax of $25 a ton would raise more than $100 billion each year and seems a reasonable starting point.

How should the proceeds be used? Perhaps the funds to be split between investments in infrastructure and pro-work tax credits. Progressives who are most concerned about climate change should rally to a carbon tax. Conservatives who believe in the power of markets should favor carbon taxes on market principles. And Americans who want to see their country lead on the energy and climate issues that are crucial to the world should want to be in the vanguard on carbon taxes.

Carbon Tax

Can Venezuela Run on Cheap Oil?

Bloomberg editorializes: Venezuela had a banner year in 2014: the world’s highest misery index (inflation plus unemployment), a fresh recession, and a currency whose black-market value fell even faster than the Russian ruble.  Venezuela’s homicide rate has risen to the second highest in the world.

Unfortunately, President Nicolas Maduro doesn’t seem to have any good ideas for improving things. In his year-end review he used the phrase “economic war” more than 60 times but offered no concrete plans for waging it.

Maduro said he plans “to perfect the currency system,” but he should instead junk the controls already in place that, along with a multi-tiered exchange system, have raised black-market currency rates to 27 times higher than official ones. In a nation that imports three-fourths of its goods, this would greatly reduce the shortages of everything from medicines to milk and toilet paper.

Despite having the world’s largest oil reserves, Venezuela can no longer afford to provide its citizens with the world’s cheapest gasoline, a subsidy that costs the government more than $12 billion a year and benefits Venezuela’s rich more than its poor. Better to phase the subsidy out, with cash payments to blunt the impact on the poorest.

Maduro said he would also trim unnecessary spending, hinting at cuts to Venezuela’s diplomatic presence. Why not cut military spending instead? From 2009 to 2013, Venezuela was the largest arms importer in South America and the 17th largest in the world. Venezuelans need less guns, more butter.

To achieve these and other reforms, Maduro will have to work with his political opponents — and he might start by, say, letting them out of jail. Opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, in particular, needs to be released from prison, and Maduro should drop his far-fetched allegations against other opposition members.  He also needs to stop tampering with Venezuela’s election processes.

This won’t happen without some quiet but firm pressure from Maduro’s fellow Latin American leaders, whose economies have also been hurt by Venezuela’s economic dysfunction, beginning with its failure to pay for imports.

Happily, President Barack Obama’s gambit to normalize relations with Cuba has given these leaders more ideological room to apply such pressure.

Venezuela

Piketty R-G and Inequality?

Clive Crook writes:   Piketty’s Capital was certainly the book of the year in its timeliness.  It sold over 500,000 copies.  The subject of inequality has come to the fore worldwide.  In the US, it is sure to be a central topic in the 2016 presidential campaign.

Whether or not Piketty’s analysis is correct is a subject of hot debate among economists.  The basic formula, which argues that the rate of return on capital is greater than the rate of economic growth, The fact that r is greater than g, he says, tends to give owners of capital an increasing share of national income; unless this is offset, by global warfare or other interruptions, it serves to widen inequality.

This formula has been contested and recently Daron Acemoglu (MIT) and James Robinson (Harvard) took the book to task.  One problem with this, as Acemoglu and Robinson explain, is that g and r aren’t independent, as Piketty’s reasoning requires. Piketty’s view about the future gap between r and g is a conjecture not a deduction, and one that’s at odds with most of the empirical evidence. Even if r did perpetually exceed g, many other factors — including a relatively modest amount of social mobility — would be capable of offsetting the effect on income inequality.

The point is, what Piketty calls laws of economics aren’t, in fact, laws. They aren’t even well-established empirical regularities. Acemoglu and Robinson:

The reader may come away from these data presented at length in Piketty’s book with the impression that the evidence supporting his proposed laws of capitalism is overwhelming. However, Piketty does not present even basic correlations between r-g and changes in inequality, much less any explicit evidence of a causal effect. Therefore, as a first step we show that the data provide little support for the general laws of capitalism he advances.

The obsession with inequality demanded, so to speak, an academic testament, and that’s what “Capital” provided. Piketty’s economics leaves a lot to be desired, but his timing was fantastic.

Piketty

Do Economic Sanctions Work?

Kenneth Rogoff writes: With Western economic sanctions against Russia, Iran, and Cuba in the news, it is a good time to take stock of the debate on just how well such measures work.

As Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott note in their classic book on the topic, the history of economic sanctions goes back at least to 432 BC, when the Greek statesman and general Pericles issued the so-called “Megarian decree” in response to the abduction of three Aspasian women. In modern times, the United States has employed economic sanctions in pursuit of diverse goals, from the Carter administration’s efforts in the 1970s to promote human rights, to attempts to impede nuclear proliferation in the 1980s.

During the Cold War, the US also employed economic sanctions to destabilize unfriendly governments, especially in Latin America.  Economic sanctions on Serbia in the early 1990s did not deter the invasion of Bosnia.

The old Soviet Union played the sanctions game as well – for example, against China, Albania, and Yugoslavia. It, too, did not have much success, except perhaps in the case of Finland..

Severe US sanctions on Cuba failed to bring the Castro regime to heel; indeed, President Barack Obama’s move to reestablish full diplomatic relations may have more effect.

But sometimes sanctions do work. The strong international consensus to impose sanctions on South Africa in the 1980s eventually helped bring an end to apartheid. Sanctions have helped bring Iran to the bargaining table. And the Russian economy today is in big trouble, though this might be described as a lucky punch, with the real damage being done by an epic collapse in global oil prices.

Some in Russia, where the price collapse has hit government revenues hard, claim that the US and Saudi Arabia are conspiring to bring Russia to its knees. But that gives US strategists far too much credit. A more likely culprit for the steep price decline is a combination of the shale-energy revolution in the US and the sharp slowdown in Chinese growth. China’s slowdown has helped precipitate a broad-based fall in commodity prices that is having a devastating effect on countries like Argentina and Brazil, with which the US authorities presumably have little quarrel.

One of the major reasons economic sanctions have fallen short in the past is that not all countries have complied.  The Kim regime in Noth Korea has clung to power despite being subject to severe economic sanctions, perhaps because China, fearing a united Korea on its border, has not yet been willing to withdraw its support.

North Korea’s alleged attack on Sony Pictures’ computers has been rightly condemned, Sony Pictures had produced a satire poking fun at North Korea’s leader, the “Young General” Kim Jong-un. This was an intolerable affront, to which the elite responded with economic sabotage rather than military action.

Russia, too, has deployed cyber attacks in the service of foreign-policy goals. Indeed, Russia has far more formidable hackers than North Korea.

In a world where nuclear proliferation has rendered global conventional war unthinkable, economic sanctions and sabotage are likely to play a large role in twenty-first-century geopolitics. Rather than preventing conflict, Pericles’s sanctions in ancient Greece ultimately helped to trigger the Peloponnesian War. One can only hope that in this century, wiser heads will prevail, and that economic sanctions lead to bargaining, not violence.

Sanctions