Ricardo Hausmann writes:  US observers, influenced by their own country’s fiscal debate, look at Greece.  Joseph Stiglitz regards austerity in Greece as a matter of ideological choice or bad economics, just like in the US. According to this view, those who favor austerity must be obsessed with the theory, given the availability of a kinder, gentler alternative. Why would you ever vote for austerity when parties like Greece’s Syriza or Spain’s Podemos offer a pain-free path?

The question reflects a lamentable tendency to conflate two very different situations. In the US, the issue was whether a government that could borrow at record-low interest rates, in the middle of a recession, should do so. By contrast, Greece piled up an enormous fiscal and external debt in boom times, until markets said “enough” in 2009.

Greece was then given unprecedented amounts of highly subsidized finance to enable it to reduce gradually its excessive spending. But now, after so much European and global generosity, Stiglitz and other economists argue that some of Greece’s debt must be forgiven to make room for more spending.

But the truth is that the recession in Greece has little to do with an excessive debt burden. Until 2014, the country did not pay, in net terms, a single euro in interest: it borrowed enough from official sources at subsidized rates to pay 100% of its interest bill and then some. This situation supposedly changed a bit in 2014, the first year that the country made a small contribution to its interest bill, having run a primary surplus of barely 0.8% of GDP (or 0.5% of its debt of 170% of GDP).

Greece’s experience highlights a truth about macroeconomic policy that is too often overlooked: The world is not dominated by austerians; on the contrary, most countries have trouble balancing their books.

Recent advances in behavioral economics show that we all have enormous problems with self-control. And game theory explains why we act even more irresponsibly when making group decisions (owing to the so-called common pool problem). Fiscal deficits, like unwanted pregnancies, are the unintended consequence of actions taken by more than one person who had other objectives in mind. And lack of fiscal control is what got Greece into trouble in the first place.

So the problem is not that austerity was tried and failed in Greece. It is that, despite unprecedented international generosity, fiscal policy was completely out of control and needed major adjustments. Insufficient spending was never an issue. From 1998 to 2007, Greece’s annual per capita GDP growth averaged 3.8%, the second fastest in Western Europe, behind only Ireland.

But by 2007, Greece was spending more than 14% of GDP in excess of what it was producing, the largest such gap. The gap was mostly fiscal and used for consumption, not investment.

Unsustainable growth paths often end in a sudden stop of capital inflows, forcing countries to bring their spending back in line with production. In Greece, however, official lenders’ unprecedented munificence made the adjustment gradual. Even after the so-called Greek Depression, its economy has grown more in per capita terms since 1998 than Cyprus, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal.

Sudden stops are always painful. Unless Greece boosts exports, spending cuts will amplify the output loss in the same way that Keynesian multipliers amplified the output gain from borrowing.

The problem is that Greece produces very little of what the world wants to consume. Its exports of goods comprise mainly fruits, olive oil, raw cotton, tobacco, and some refined petroleum products. Germany, which many argue should spend more, imports just 0.2% of its goods from Greece. Tourism is a mature industry with plenty of regional competitors. The country produces no machines, electronics, or chemicals. Of every $10 of world trade in information technology, Greece accounts for $0.01.

In 2008 the gap between Greece’s income and the knowledge content of its exports was the largest among a sample of 128 countries.

Greece needs to develop its productive capabilities if it wants to grow. The unfocused set of structural reforms prescribed by its current financing agreement will not do that. Instead, Greece should concentrate on activist policies that attract globally competitive firms.

Takashi Nakamichi writes:  Japan’s central bank should hold fire on extra measures for some time to ensure the economy doesn’t “overheat,” an economic adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said.

The inflation rate may be falling back toward zero on a drop in global oil prices, but it will “eventually start rising on its own” and likely reach around 2% by early 2016.

Mr. Honda, one of the most vocal advocates of aggressive monetary easing, said cheaper oil in the long run will strengthen inflationary pressure by stimulating consumer spending. A weak yen, the effects of the ongoing Bank of Japan easing, and anticipated increases in base pay this year will also put upward pressure on prices.

“Under these circumstances, if you undertook additional monetary easing, (the inflation rate) would go even higher,” Mr. Honda, a Shizuoka University professor, said. “Is it necessary to do such a thing?”

Mr. Honda added that even if the inflation rate declines further, as long as the main cause of it is an oil-driven drop in costs, and as long as Japan’s demand-supply gap is improving, “additional easing shouldn’t be undertaken.” Otherwise, the economy “could overheat over the latter half of this year,” he said.

Mr. Honda’s remarks were the latest in a series of comments from the government and advisers to the prime minister suggesting that the Abe administration sees additional easing as counterproductive, at least in the near-term. The development represents a rare departure from the traditional pattern in which the government regularly pushes the BOJ to do more to end a decade and a half of deflation.

Ruling party politicians appear particularly worried that if extra easing causes the yen to weaken more, further raising the costs of imports, that would reflect poorly on their parties in next month’s municipal elections. Yet if domestic demand remains weak beyond the summer, further easing could become necessary.  The yen’s  period of excessive strength appears to have ended.

A measure of fair value known as purchasing power parity suggests the present dollar-yen levels may be at a kind of upper limit in the exchange rate’s comfort zone.

The yen could weaken further if the BOJ takes additional easing action or if the U.S. Federal Reserve starts raising its policy interest rate, but that would only be a temporary “overshoot,” Mr. Honda said. “Even if the Japanese yen depreciated more, it would come back to the comfort zone. That’s my guess.”

During the month of February, Russia used 10 percent of its reserve fund to make up for revenue shortfalls due to low oil prices.

The Reserve Fund is used to support public finances in times of low prices for exports, and is held in dollars, euros and British pounds.  It fell to $77.05 billion from $85.09 billion in January.  The 20 percent fall in the ruble was sharper.

The finance ministry used 500 billion rubles ($8 billion) from the fund to supplement a drop in budget revenue.

Cuts of 10 percent are planned in most aras of government spending this year, with defense and infrastructure spending largely exempt, in response to a fall in the price of oil and gas. Around half of Russian government revenues typically come from taxes on the oil and gas industries.