Paul J. Sauders writes:  Notwithstanding its extensive arms trade with Algeria, Russia’s political relations with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and his government seem curiously constrained.  On one hand, Algeria is a top market for Russian weapons. For example, Russian media have only recently reported a massive 2014 deal under which Algeria will assemble 200 T-90 tanks using kits supplied by Russia’s state arms supplier Rosoboronexport — a contract one Russian military expert estimated at $1 billion and described as “possibly the largest export contract for main battle tanks in the world.”

According to the report in the business-oriented newspaper Vedomosti, the contract follows a 2010 sale of 185 T-90 tanks as well as a 2013 agreement to buy equipment to modernize 300 Soviet- supplied T-72 tanks. At the same time, Russia is reportedly building two Kilo-class submarines for Algeria. In 2006, Rosoboronexport announced a $7.5 billion sale of jet fighters, training aircraft, missile systems and tanks after a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Bouteflika that also yielded an agreement to write off $4.74 billion in Soviet-era debt held by Russia.

On the other hand, the Kremlin website does not report a Putin-Bouteflika meeting since the 2006 session, although then-President Dmitry Medvedev traveled to Algeria to meet his counterpart in 2010.

Russian and Algerian officials have interacted more frequently at lower levels, of course. Still, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has apparently not met bilaterally with Algeria’s Foreign Minister Ramtan Lamamra since February 2014.

Kiriyenko signed a nuclear cooperation agreement that sounds analogous to America’s so-called 123 Agreements — a defining foundation for future talks rather than a commitment to any specific projects.

Russia’s relationship with Algeria looks like cautious and hyper-pragmatic interaction between two governments that may want a variety of things from one another but have trouble reaching a broader understanding on key issues. In some respects this would be an extension of their Cold War relationship, in which Algeria’s nationalists were more than willing to accept Soviet arms — and to define their independent country as a People’s Democratic Republic and to pursue socialist economic policies — but were not so interested in substituting one colonial master for another.

While Russia surely welcomes Algeria as an arms customer — especially while its economy is struggling under sanctions — Moscow seems unlikely to get what it may want most from Bouteflika and his government. Given Algeria’s role as a leading gas supplier to Europe, and therefore a leading alternative to Gazprom, energy cooperation may well be first on the Kremlin’s list. Despite this, Gazprom’s role in the country remains limited to some modest exploration activities. Perhaps more significant, Russia has been largely unable to co-opt Algeria to advance its energy geopolitics strategy toward influencing Europe.  Moscow has not permitted its inability to get everything it desires from Algeria to stand in the way of what it can accomplish. And selling 200 tanks for $1 billion is indeed an accomplishment.

by Polyp

Wassim Bassem writes: You will not find any Iraqi grown vegetables and fruits in Iraq.  Instead you’ll find imported goods from Jordan, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf countries.

In fact, Iraqi agricultural products are not found in many local grocery stores, as if Iraq is no longer producing food products. The same applies to locally manufactured products, such as tissues, luxury items and drinks, which cannot be found in the markets. Yet, markets are overflowing with all sorts of imported goods.

Maytham Elaibi, an economist and academic researcher at the University of Baghdad, said that the major collapse in the domestic production of goods is attributed to “the economic policies that have failed to support factories and farm owners in making their products profitable.  The low salaries have prompted workers to move from the private to the public sector, which increased disguised unemployment, which is unproductive.”

Iraqis not only suffer from the absence of local goods, but also from widespread low-quality imports. They accuse traders of importing cheap commodities at the expense of quality, to realize the greatest possible profits. These practices were confirmed by China’s commercial attache in Iraq, Wang Xi Tong, who blamed the Iraqi traders of “importing poor-quality products.  The low-quality imports now also include medicines.

Protests took place in Basra, southeast of Baghdad, demanding that the market be revitalized with locally made products. Member of the Council of Representatives of Iraq Hamam Hamoudi called on March 18 for buttressing the local industry with locally made products to boost the country’s economy.

In this context, Salama al-Salhi, cultural consultant to the prime minister, said:  “Since 2003, the Iraqi market has been wide open to the entry of goods from various origins and of bad quality.” Salhi attributed the low-quality products to “the absence of quality control and consumer protection laws,” and the declining industrial and agricultural production to “the displacement of farmers to the cities because of desertification and their integration into the ranks of the armed forces.

Masoudi did not rule out the presence of “political goals behind the lack of advancement of the Iraqi production.” He added, “A war is being waged against Iraqi products, in favor of [products from] countries such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which benefit from Iraq as a market consuming their goods.”  Government statistics show that Iraq’s imported goods are worth $65 million per year.