Quotas for Women in Japan

Abe’s plan to require businesses with 300-plus employees to establish targets for hiring women and getting them into management positions is a good start. But the policy is rife with escape clauses. Formal and binding quotas akin to Norway’s would have more teeth. Tokyo should at least start mandating leadership roles at the public-sector level and expand from there.

Abe is looking to Norway for guidance:  Norway introduced a 40% quota for female directors of listed companies in 2006, to come into force in 2008.  Non-complying firms could theoretically be forcibly dissolved, though none has in fact suffered such a fate. Since then gender quotas for boards have been imposed in Belgium, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (though with less severe sanctions: non-complying firms must generally explain in their annual reports why they fell short and what they plan to do about it). The European Commission is considering imposing quotas across the EU. Malaysia has imposed a 30% quota for new appointments to boards, and Brazil a 40% target, though only for state-controlled firms. The governments of several other countries, including Australia, Britain and Sweden, have threatened to impose quotas if firms do not appoint more female directors voluntarily. So why are gender quotas becoming more common?

One reason is a growing impatience with the glacial pace of voluntary change: women are the majority of all graduates almost everywhere in the developed world, but make up a smaller share of the workforce the further up the corporate ladder they go. Another is that Norway’s quota law has not been the disaster some predicted. “As a principle, I don’t like quotas,” Ider Kreutzer, the former chief executive of Storebrand, an insurance group, told the Financial Times the year after the law came into force. “But I have not been able to find any big problems with the legislation in practice.” Some had worried that they would actually decrease diversity by forcing companies to dive for the same small pool of eligible women, nicknamed the “golden skirts”. In fact, Norway still has more “golden trousers”—male directors are twice as likely to sit on more than one board. Nor did it obviously lead to less qualified boards: female Norwegian board members are more likely to have a degree than male ones.

Whether you think robust measures to increase the share of women in senior management are a good thing in the first place depends partly on how convinced you are that diversity in management is important. It might improve performance by mirroring the diversity of customers—or, as our Schumpeter columnist recently argued (though about cultural rather than gender diversity), it might increase conflict, worsen communication and reduce workplace trust. Easier to dismiss is the still-common objection that quotas are anti-meritocratic: that is more true of the status quo. Oodles of research demonstrates that women are evaluated less positively than identically qualified men when applying for stereotypically male jobs, such as leadership roles. One study found that a commitment by hiring committees to shortlists with at least 25% women helped to remove anti-woman bias.

Over time, advocates of quotas hope that a sudden large increase in the number of women in leadership will change attitudes.

Gender Equality for Japan?

How to Measure a Bank’s Solidiity?

Matt Levine writes:  Ever since about mid 2008, when everyone had a massive panic about bank capital, there has been a community of people who wanted to ignore the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and their “Tier One Ratio” (based on equity divided by “risk weighted assets” or RWA). Instead, people like Anat Admati or Andy Haldane have suggested that we should just take the equity in the balance sheet, and divide it by the assets to get a “leverage ratio” without any of this complicated risk weighting stuff.

Are they right? In my opinion, yes to the extent that they want to look at the leverage ratio, but very much no to the extent that they want to get rid of risk weighting. It’s true that risk weighted assets and the Basel framework have gone badly wrong in the past and even contributed to some failures. But to take that as a reason for throwing the whole system away is not helpful.

MYTH — Leverage is a “simple” and objective calculation

FACT — Only if you think that calculating a bank balance sheet is simple and objective

MYTH — Leverage is a more conservative standard than RWA

FACT — Unless you make major adjustments to the “simple” leverage ratio, it misses whole categories of risk.

MYTH — Leverage ratios can’t be “gamed” by the banks.

FACT — Leverage ratios are very often gamed

MYTH — Risk weighted asset calculations are always fudged and faked by the banks

FACT — No evidence has been found of this despite a dozen studies

There are two, related, legitimate reasons why the leverage ratio is a big step forward.

First, it acts as a checksum. Most of the things that a bank might do to fool the risk-weighted asset ratio would have the effect of making the balance sheet bigger and the leverage ratio worse. Most of the things that a bank might do to fool the leverage ratio would have the effect of piling up tail risks and making the risk-weighted assets ratio worse. It’s comparatively difficult to think of measures which can fool both ratios at the same time.

Second, and related to this, it helps to avoid “corner solutions”. What you don’t ever want to do in banking is to create the impression that a particular line of business has a zero capital requirement.  If you have more than one ratio, you have much less chance that any activity is going to get a very low capital charge.

Leverages are useful but not simple.  Leveraging

No Simple Answers

No Simple Answers

 

Calpers Pulls Out of Hedge Funds

Calpers puling out of hedge funds.  Are hedge funds toxic?

Mohamed A. El-Erian writes:  The decision of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System to pull out of its hedge-fund investments continues to attract lots of attention, and understandably so. Calpers is the largest U.S. pension fund and is among those that continue to seek a relatively high rate of return to help pay the health and retirement benefits of millions of public employees. It is also highly respected.

The observers who analyzed the Calpers withdrawal focused on three drivers cited by the institution itself: cost, complexity and scale.

The cost argument is the most straightforward. Most hedge funds still try to apply a “2 and 20” model in which they charge their investors a fee of 2 percent of assets they manage and keep 20 percent of the gains above a specified level. For this, clients have access to the ability to leverage, customize derivatives, and to take long or short positions on particular securities.  As such, these investments have the potential to generate positive (or “absolute”) returns regardless of cycles and market conditions.

Fees.  The 2 percent fee is harder to sell to investors in a world of lower expected returns.  It becomes even harder when clients also face the challenge of continuously identifying top-performing managers to invest with.

Managers.  The selection of an investment manager is a complex science, as well as an art. I Only a small number of firms (such as the Baupost Group under the leadership of Seth Klarman) have been able to maintain consistently superior performance over time.

Scale.  For hedge funds to make a material difference, Calpers needed to invest significant dollars in a space where incremental returns could easily have zero-sum characteristics — meaning a loss for every gain.

All these elements speak to a broader historical phenomenon. The use of hedge funds became popular in the last decade as many institutional investors sought to replicate the “endowment model” first pursued by foundations and universities. This model seeks to go where others aren’t, taking advantage of the long-term nature of the investible funds (“permanent capital”).

But the resulting migration, which has been considerable in recent years, has inevitably eroded its potential for generating revenue — as have the increasingly “winner takes all” outcomes that now dominate some particularly enticing investment destinations.

Outperforming others by diverging from the consensus becomes a lot more difficult if the consensus is joining you. That is what occurred to Calpers and other investors that had looked to hedge funds as a reliable source of superior absolute returns.

This is all the more reason that investors have to do an even better job in their selection of managers. While the result is likely to be lower growth in the overall allocations to hedge funds, the substitutes should not be limited to traditional public markets.

Given today’s realities, investors many may need to develop greater in-house expertise to invest opportunistically in a bigger range of one-off single assets — particularly those done directly.

In that way, they can take advantage of the coming disposal of assets by the restructuring European banks, of the enormous need for infrastructure development, and of the opportunity to better match demand and supply in the more stable emerging economies.

Calpers Cuts Hedge FUnds

Gender Gap in the Boardroom.

Beth Brooke-Marciniak writes:  As the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap report reveals how far the world still is from achieving gender parity, I believe that one of the most important places to advocate change is right at the top: boards of directors.

The gender gap in corporate leadership isn’t just a women’s issue. It’s an issue of competitiveness. Simply put, diversity in leadership enhances corporate performance. The evidence abounds. In 2012, EY reviewed 22,000 audits our member firms were performing in four countries on three continents. We found that gender-balanced teams were much more successful than other teams. They don’t just outperform other teams in quality – they also bring back better returns.

Research shows that companies with at least one woman on the board have a higher return on equity, higher earnings and a stronger growth in stock price than companies with all-male boards. Bringing diverse voices to the table improves the solutions we see. Yet the reality is, all too often, women’s voices are not represented.

In the US, for instance, women make up 51% of the population and account for 59% of our graduate school enrollees. Yet according to our research, they represent only 15% of board members of the top S&P 1500 companies.

In our own industry, we see a similar trend. Despite the fact that women have represented about 50% of new certified public accountants (CPAs) in the accounting profession for the past 20 years, only 19% of partners in CPA firms nationwide are women. These numbers are better than at any time in the past, but they’re nowhere near good enough.

So how can companies close the gender gap in leadership roles, and consequently make themselves more competitive?

First, the public sector needs to focus attention on the issue. More than 20 countries have adopted quotas for women on corporate boards. Some have seen dramatic change after having set significant consequences. Norway is the most prominent example. Publicly traded companies there that fall short of a 40% quota can be dissolved by court order. The country went from having 9% representation of women in 2003 to more than 40% in 2012.

However, we view quotas as a “sledgehammer” of last resort. A better approach is when public officials first champion voluntary targets, and companies proactively meet them.

Second, private sector leaders need to commit. Several organizations, sometimes working with executive search firms, have compiled directories of “board-ready” women. This can help to counter suggestions there aren’t enough viable female candidates for leadership and board roles.

Twenty per cent  of the board seats at S&P 1500 companies were held by directors nearing or exceeding the common board retirement age of 72. It will take committed leadership from both genders to ensure that a significant percentage of the new board members are women.

Third, businesses need to be more transparent. In several countries, disclosure standards for listed companies now include requirements to report on gender diversity policies. This gives investors the information they need to hold companies accountable for board diversity.

In the US, investors have used shareholder proposals seeking greater gender and/or ethnic diversity on boards to prompt change in board policies and composition. Of the 26 proposals we tracked in 2013, nearly 75% of the targeted companies changed their board recruitment criteria to include diversity measures.

Finally, and importantly, greater diversity at the top sets a tone of inclusiveness that permeates the business. It can help foster a corporate culture that develops women and supports the careers of future female leaders.

Women on Boards

Should We Factor the Virtual Economy Into GNP?

Bill Davidow writes: Our techniques for measuring economic performance are obsolete. So we reach improper conclusions about the state of the economy.

The economic recovery is probably more robust than we realize. It is possible that the standard of living for many members of the middle class is improving while their incomes shrink. Many economists, policy makers, and politicians think otherwise, because they are using 20th-century methods to analyze our 21st-century economy.

The problem is caused by the fact that we live in two worlds, physical and virtual.

The physical economy is anemic, struggling, biased toward inflation, and shrinking in many developed countries. Almost everything we do in the physical economy is paid for with money. We use dollars to measure most of the activity. If more dollars are spent or earned, we conclude that the economy is growing.

The virtual economy is robust, biased toward deflation, and growing at staggering rates, everywhee.  The Virtual Economy

Virtual Worlds

 

Getting Girls to Code

Reshma Saujani writes:  The idea for Girls Who Code came about when I was running for office in 2010 in New York City. I’ve always been a policy junky, but when you’re actually on the campaign trail you get to see issues in a much more immediate way. I was visiting schools and talking to teachers and parents across the district and I saw that our kids weren’t learning computer science, and that the gender and socioeconomic divide in tech access was just enormous. With 1.4 million jobs in the computing fields by 2020, I knew we had to do something to close that gap.

At Girls Who Code, we’ve gone from one program teaching 20 girls to reaching 3,000 by the end of 2014 through Summer Immersion Programs and Girls Who Code Clubs. This summer alone we are in NYC, Boston, Miami, Seattle, and all over the Bay Area with programs at Adobe, Amazon, AppNexus, AT&T, eBay, Facebook, GE, Goldman Sachs, Google, IAC, Intel, Intuit, Microsoft, Square, Twitter, and Verizon.

The most interesting (and inspiring!) part of championing young women in tech is that they really become our ambassadors in the movement. When they graduate from our summer immersion program, they know they’ve learned something special and they go on and teach other girls and start clubs at their schools and libraries.

As far as challenges, I think people just don’t realize how bad the problem is. Jaws drop when I tell people that in 1984, 37% of CS majors were women, and now that number is 12%.

Girls Who Code

Argentina’s Education System Stalled by Digital Gap

Technology has not entered the school system in Argentina.  Teachers are still more uncomfortable with technology than their students are.  The debate between educators who want to move the country forward to become competitive in areas of science and technology and those that feel that all children must be brought up to digital literacy before a new upgrade is undertaken has not been resolved.  The education system is stallled.

Education?

Turkey Struggles with Inflation

Mehmet Cetingulec writes:  Turkey’s Central Bank, whose resistance to government pressure to lower interest rates proved to be the right decision, has not had the same success in ensuring financial stability by controlling inflation.

The Central Bank’s record against inflation has been dismal not only this year, but for several years.Since Erdem Besci was appointed its governor in 2011, none of the bank’s inflation aims have been achieved.

In 2011, annual inflation was predicted to be 5.5% but ended up at 10.4%. In 2012, the bank’s inflation target was 5%, but it ended up 6.16%. The 2013 target was 5% but the result was 7.4%. The 2014 target was set at 5.3%, then adjusted upward to 6.6%. But it’s now clear that even that target won’t be hit.

Turkey’s Central Bank has two basic duties: keeping inflation under control and ensuring stability in financial markets. In 1997, the bank and the Treasury signed an agreement to cooperate to lower inflation rates.  The idea was to lower inflation by adopting monetary and financial measures in cooperation with relevant public agencies. Though this protocol is valid, inflation still cannot be lowered.

The Central Bank had forecast improvement in inflation after June 2014. Basci, under heavy pressure, had promised lower inflation and interest rates in a June 2 presentation to the council of ministers. On June 3, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was unhappy with Basci, said “The Central Bank said it will lower interest rates… I don’t find their approach to interest rates worthwhile.”

What the prime minister had meant to say was explained by pro-government Sabah, which reported that the governor was given a three-month grace period.

But months have passed and the anticipated reduction in inflation and therefore in interest rates did not materialize. When the trend continued unabated, the 5.3% inflation rate was pushed up to 9.5%. By naming this new target in its medium-term program, the government has acknowledged in advance that the inflation rate will double by the end of the year.

Meanwhile, the IMF revised its prediction for Turkey’s inflation upward to 9% from 7.8%. Inflation did not go down and the interest rate was not reduced, but the alternative plan that was to be applied after the three-month grace period was not introduced.

Prime Minister Erdogan, who was targeting Basci, has since been elected president. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who formed the new government, does not have the luxury of making controversial decisions by changing the economic management when the regional developments signal increased risks.

Babacan and his economic management team stipulated the lowering of inflation as the primary target of its 2015-17 program, whereas earlier, the primary target was to lower the current deficit. That target has been achieved to some extent. The current deficit, which was above $60 billion at the end of last year, is now below $50 billion. The goal will be now to achieve the same success in lowering inflation. But it is not possible. Neither Babacan nor Basci have enough time to leave behind a legacy of success.

Inflation in Turkey

Bad Ideas Linger on in Economic Policy

Barry Ritholtz writes about the consequences of holding on to bad ideas.  There are none for the people who came up with them in the first place.  Particularly think tanks just go blissfully forward.

Here are some ideas that have failed without sufficient notice:  Profit maximizing economic actors, austerity as a virtuous policy during recessions, the efficient-market hypothesis, tax cuts pay for themselves, self-regulating markets.

During the financial crisis, including many attempts to negate the role radical deregulation of financial markets had as an underlying cause of the crisis. American Enterprise Institute’s Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto were the leading proponents of the anything-but-deregulation causation. First, they blamed the Community Reinvestment Act — the anti-redlining legislation that had nothing to do with subprime lending. Next, it was the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Housing Administration. When that didn’t hold up they blamed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. When most of the subprime loans that went bust were shown to be from private lenders that didn’t follow Fannie or Freddie guidelines, they quietly changed the subject.
Regulation

Fees Don’t Create Real Wealth

Rentier skims do not contribute to real wealth,  Charles Hughes Smith suggests.

The classic example is a fee collected to pass from one fiefdom’s border to the next: no value is provided to the person paying the border fee; it is a rentier skim that transfers wealth from serfs to the fiefdom’s landowning nobility.

In the modern economy, rentier skims take a variety of forms. The government is adept at levying rentier skims. Harsh penalty fees piled on top of minor traffic violations are one example; another is extra fees to “expedite” services government is supposed to provide in a timely manner.

A California architect recently recounted the new fee structure in a Northern California municipality: the fee to have the city planning department review your building permit application leaped to $6,000. Since the department warned applicants it will take at least six months for the agency to process the application, they kindly offer an alternative: for a mere $4,000 more (an “expedited fee”), the applicant can get his application reviewed in a mere four months rather than six months.

Planned obsolescence provides many other examples of rentier skims. Microsoft’s operating systems and hardware makers both operate a form of rentier skim, in that each new OS and device offers marginal benefits (if any) in terms of productivity. The rare printer that doesn’t break down in a few years is obsoleted as software drivers are no longer available on the new OS.

Cartels and quasi-monopolies offer a wealth (ahem) of rentier skims. Monopolies can raise prices and degrade services at will. Cartels maintain price controls while denying they do any such thing.

Finance offers the richest opportunities for rentier skim. Load up college students with tens of thousands of dollars in high-interest student loans for marginal educations that could be provided at a fraction of the cost.

The net result of an economy of endless rentier skims is stagnation and rising wealth inequality. Money that could be saved and invested in productive enterprises and infrastructure is skimmed off.

Simply put, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. This is the teleology of every rentier economy: the built-in consequence of rentier skims is increasing wealth inequality and economic stagnation.

Rentier Schemes