Abe Going Forward in Japan

In the wake of his reinstatement as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party for another three-year term, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe plans to reshuffle his Cabinet and LDP executive posts possibly in early October as part of efforts to push forward his economic program.

The Japan Post initial public offering could be just what the doctor ordered to enliven the country’s stagnant banking sector.

The Bank of Japan refrains from boosting stimulus even though the economy shrank in the last quarter.

Standard & Poor’s has cut the nation’s long-term credit rating one level to A+, saying it sees little chance of the government’s current strategy accelerating growth and inflation over the next few years.  Downgrade not thought to matter much.

The Bank of Japan’s closely watched tankan survey of business sentiment, due out Oct. 1, is expected to show the first decline in three quarters.

Abe Going Forward

Emissions Scandal: Libor on Four Wheels

In the US, in important consumer areas like banking and automobiles, we pass legislation that protects consumers and keeps them safe.  In theory.  We have often discussed the problem of banking regulation on this site.  The ongoing Volkswagen emissions scandal is part and parcel with our failure to jail culpable bankers.

In this case, we regulate fuel emissions to improve the environment.  Often car manufacturers conduct the emissions tests.  If they don’t, the test are conducted in controlled venues.  Cr manufacturers have figured out how to make cars look like they are complying with emissions standards  under these tests.  When the car goes out on the road, the car no longer meets the standards.

In Europe and in the US, diesel cars are desirable because they burn less fuel.  However, with emissions standards, it is apparently difficult to make a profit with a fuel efficient, environmentally-sound vehicle.

What happened with VW was Libor on wheels.  There is no doubt that other car manufacturers will be outed.  Ford already made a deal with the government.

If we take the time to make rules and laws, shouldn’t we try hard to enforce them?   Slowly people like Senators Warren and Sherrod Brown are calling the public’s attention to banking irregularities that tear down economies.  Cars will be next.

Libor on Wheels

 

SEC Asks Offenders to Cough Up Individuals

Yves Smith writes:  The Department of Justice may face an early test of its long-overdue policy change, that the government will seek to prosecute individuals, including executives, along with those of corporations. As Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney and author of the memo setting forth the new policy, put it, “We mean it when we say, ‘You have got to cough up the individuals.’”

Private plaintiffs have filed two suits alleging bid-rigging by the 22 primary dealers, adding pressure to an ongoing Department of Justice investigation.

The same analytical technique that uncovered cheating in currency markets and the Libor rates benchmark — resulting in about $20 billion of fines — suggests the dealers who control the U.S. Treasury market rigged bond auctions for years, according to a lawsuit….

The plaintiffs built their case against the 22 primary dealers who serve as the backbone of Treasury trading — including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Morgan Stanley — using data from Rosa Abrantes-Metz, an adjunct associate professor at New York University who has provided expert testimony in rigging cases.

Bear in mind that investigations and litigation is underway, and no charges have yet been proven. However, in the last major Treasury bid-rigging scandal, in 1991, the Fed didn’t bother to wait for the Department of Justice to act.  SEC Says- Cough Up Individual Wrongdoers

Too Big to Jail

Central Bank Independence?

Howard Davies writes:  In 1993, the economists Alberto Alesina and Larry Summers published a seminal paper that argued that central bank independence keeps inflation in check, with no adverse consequences for economic performance. Since then, countries around the world have made their central banks independent. None has reversed course, and any hint that governments might reassert political control over interest rates, as happened recently in India, are met with alarm in financial markets and outrage among economists.
In truth, however, there are many degrees of independence, and not all nominally independent central banks operate in the same way. Some monetary authorities, like the European Central Bank, set their own target. Others, like the Bank of England (BoE), have full instrument independence – control over short-term interest rates – but must meet an inflation target set by the government.

There are differences, too, in how central banks are organized to deliver their objectives. In New Zealand, the bank’s governor is the sole decision-maker. At the US Federal Reserve, decisions are made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), whose members – seven governors and five presidents of the Fed’s regional reserve banks – enjoy varying degrees of independence.  The Independence of Central Banks

 

Deposit Insurance Not Good for Banks?

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache, World Bank, Development Research Group, and International Monetary Fund, Research Department write:

In a system without deposit insurance depositors have a big incentive to monitor their banks behaviour, to ensure they do not act in a manner which may endanger their solvency. (If the government didn’t promise to repay your money in the case that your bank fails, would you not be a little more concerned about how the bank uses your money?). In a system with deposit insurance this incentive is removed. Economists call this moral hazard. Moral hazard is when the provision of insurance changes the behaviour of those who receive the insurance in a undesirable way. For example, if you have contents insurance on your house you may be less careful about securing it against burglary than you otherwise might be.

Deposit insurance removes depositors incentive to monitor bank lending decisions because they are guaranteed to receive their money back. Instead, depositors are incentivised by the interest rate offered. Of course, those banks offering the highest interest rate will be those taking the greatest risks, and so banks are incentivised to finance the highest risk, highest return projects.

While higher interest rates may seem to benefit depositors due to higher returns (but not taxpayers – due to greater risks leading to more financial crisis and bailouts) it reality they do not. Instead of offering a higher rate of interest the private bank can offer a lower rate, because the deposit is risk free. This results in a subsidy to the banking sector – the value of which reached over £100bn in 2008.

So despite the fact that deposit insurance is intended to increase the stability of the banking system by preventing bank runs it may in fact make it more dangerous by encouraging risky behaviour from banks:

The U.S. Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s has been widely attributed to the moral hazard created by a combination of generous deposit insurance, financial liberalization, and regulatory failure… Thus, according to economic theory, while deposit insurance may increase bank stability by reducing self-fulfilling or information-driven depositor runs, it may decrease bank stability by encouraging risk-taking on the part of banks.   Banks are Different from Other Businesses

Bank Deposit Insurance

Admati Hammers at Risk-Taking Bankers

Dean Starkman writes:  Anat R. Admati, a professor of finance and economics at Stanford’s business school, is an unlikely player in Washington’s financial reform scene.

The Israeli-born economist arrived at Stanford in 1983 with an interest in mainstream financial issues and a firm belief that markets—with their unique ability to assign a price to risk and channel capital to its most efficient use—were a powerful force for good.

The 2008 financial crisis upended that faith. She turned her gaze to the industry at the center of the crisis: banking.

Admati made waves on the national financial reform scene in 2013 with the book “The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It,” co-authored with economist and banking expert Martin Hellwig.

Here’s an excerpt of a discussion with Admati:

Why did you write “The Bankers’ New Clothes,” a book for the general public and not strictly for scholars?

We thought we had to. There was, I thought, a certain lack of engagement on the part of many academics, and it was disturbing to me that there was not enough serious discussion about what was going on.

I was not a banking expert, but after studying it, I found that a lot of policymakers and people commenting on it didn’t actually know what they were saying or were saying wrong things or misleading things.

There seemed to be, to take a charitable interpretation, that there were blind spots or confusion or, the most cynical interpretation, there was sort of willful blindness.

How did you get so involved in Washington financial policy circles?

From the beginning, I tried very hard to engage with anybody in Washington who would engage with me. It started by being appointed by Sheila Bair (then the FDIC chairwoman) to a committee in the spring of 2011, which just allowed me into the room at all.

So, what’s wrong with banking?

What’s wrong with banking is that a lot of people are able to take risks and not be fully responsible and accountable for those actions.

People need to understand that the biggest banks are really, really big, by any measure. Just how much is a trillion? It’s an enormous number. They are larger than just about any corporation, so it’s not just big. It’s really very, very big.

It’s also the complexity and sort of breathless scope of what they do and just how much of it is opaque. It remains incredibly fragile as a system.

Capital requirements, boiled down, amount to a few percentage points of a bank’s total assets. What’s the right ratio?

Current requirements are ridiculous by any normal standards. A supposedly “harsh” regulation would be 5 percent of the total. Corporations just never ever live like that.

I talk about 20 percent-30 percent of assets, but what’s really complicated is how you measure assets. The way assets are measured now pretends to be scientific, but the rules are designed in a flawed way. I want simpler measures and for capital to be 20 percent-30 percent of the total.

Anat Admati

HSBC “Lagarde List” Goes to Cyprus

Petro Petrides writes:  France has handed to Cypriot authorities a controversial list of Cypriots with deposits at HSBC bank in Switzerland, Finance Minister Harris Georgiades said.Cypriot parliamentarians probing the cause of the near melt-down of the economy in 2013 have repeatedly urged the government to obtain the so-called “Lagarde List” in anticipation that it will provide clues to people who may have sent abroad money obtained illegally.But Georgiades told CyBC radio that foreign deposits are not illegal and details contained in the list cannot be made public unless legislation banning publication of personal data is amended.

“The list is currently being examined by the Chief Taxation Officer to confirm that those appearing on the list as Cypriots or with an address in Cyprus can justify the deposited amount,” Georgiades said.

“It will be processed so as to verify that taxation has been paid for the amounts deposited in the bank,” he added.

Georgiades said he would have no problem disclosing the names of people which will be found to be tax evaders after the examination of the list.

But the list has been forwarded to the speaker of the Cypriot Parliament, Yiannakis Omirou, for examination in the context of an ongoing investigation into the causes of Cyprus’s economic disaster.

Lawmakers are demanding that any names in the list of “politically exposed people” — meaning people holding state, government and party posts or are associated with the the banking system and the media — must be made public.

It is to be expected that it will not be long before the list is leaked to the media as it happened with similar documents in the past.

The “Lagarde List” is part of a wider list, the Falciani list, named after Herve Falciani, an HSBC bank computer technician who stole the data from the computers of his employers from 2006 through 2007 and handed them to then French finance Minister Christine Lagarde.

It is believed the list contains about 80,000 names of people with deposits at the bank.

Georgiades said the list obtained by Cypriot authorities contains only the names of either Cypriot people or foreign physical and legal entities who had given the bank a correspondence address in Cyprus.

The “Lagarde List” became prominent when it was handed to the Greek government in 2012, then negotiating the country’s bailout with international lenders.

It was leaked to a magazine which published it, causing a public outcry as it revealed that the names of some prominent people in the governing party were among depositors.

 Lagarde List

Jail Bankers. Put Muscle in Criminal Pleas

Is it in the interest of senior bankers to violate the law?  William K. Black writes:  The parent organizations of five of the world’s biggest banks will plead guilty to rigging global currency markets rattled the financial markets. But it also raised concerns about whether fines and settlements are effective deterrents to fraudulent behavior.

The five banks will pay the U.S. Justice Department and the Federal Reserve fines totaling $5.6 billion as they agreed to plead guilty to colluding to manipulate currency and interest rate markets. Yet, they could continue to do business as usual, thanks to settlement terms and waivers against stiffer actions from the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

At  UBS, the latest case is the third act of rigging it has confessed to in the last five years. “The only thing that could save UBS is to have a crackdown by somebody external that gets rid of this assorted group of managers.”

Here is a snapshot of what the four banks detailed in their plea agreements, according to a U.S. Justice Department press release: “Members of ‘The Cartel’ manipulated the euro-dollar exchange rate by agreeing to withhold bids or offers for euros or dollars to avoid moving the exchange rate in a direction adverse to open positions held by co-conspirators. By agreeing not to buy or sell at certain times, the traders protected each other’s trading positions by withholding supply of or demand for currency and suppressing competition in the FX market.”

The foreign exchange and Libor bid-rigging cases individually are the largest cartels by three orders of magnitude in world financial history.

Here is how the fines add up to $5.6 billion: The banks will pay $2.5 billion in criminal penalties for manipulating currency rates, plus another $1.6 billion in fines payable to the Federal Reserve. The remainder will come from penalties of $1.3 billion that Barclays will pay U.S. and British regulators and $203 million that UBS will pay for manipulating interest rates.

The whiff of big money is a factor to think about for regulators.  said Nichols.  The amount of money that moves through the foreign exchange market in one day is almost twice the value of the economic output of the U.K. in one year.

U.S. regulators protect bankers from winding up in jail.  Banks negotiate in advance that a guilty plea will not be what a guilty plea would normally be.

Was stronger action was warranted in the case of UBS?  Should banks secure waivers against stern action. “The rule with large banks is that the SEC always waives – it doesn’t matter how bad [the violations are],” he said. “This is a serial recidivism.” He noted that one SEC commissioner is working to prevent routine waivers that the SEC grants.

 

Possible remedies:  Put a fraudulently controlled bank in receivership.  Receivership should probably be an option only for banks that seem irredeemable, and it might make more sense for most banks to just create a better internal culture.

Unlike with bribers, bankers do not face the risk of imprisonment. The material rewards for violating the rules and the trust of clients are huge, while the risk is almost nonexistent.

Jail Bankers?

 

Warren and Corruption in US

  • Pam Martens and Russ Martens write:  The Insurance Industry Pays Incentives Like a Mercedes-Benz Lease to Push Annuity Sales

Increasingly it feels to Americans that the bulk of the news about scams to separate them from their life savings is coming from one Senator from Massachusetts — Elizabeth Warren.

Ripoffs in financial services, insurance, and real estate – known as F.I.R.E. on Wall Street – are being exposed by Warren, typically in bold pronouncements in Senate Banking hearings where Warren has a chair and a respected voice, and are rapidly amplified in the media.

In 2013, it was only because of Senator Warren that we learned that the so-called Independent Foreclosure Reviews to settle the claims of 4 million homeowners who had been illegally foreclosed on by the bailed out Wall Street banks were a sham. The “independent” consultants were hired by the banks, paid by the banks, and the banks themselves were allowed to determine the number of victims.

It was Senator Warren who put the high frequency trading scam described in the Michael Lewis book, “Flash Boys,” into layman’s language.

“High frequency trading reminds me a little of the scam in Office Space. You know, you take just a little bit of money from every trade in the hope that no one will complain. But taking a little bit of money from zillions of trades adds up to billions of dollars in profits for these high frequency traders and billions of dollars in losses for our retirement funds and our mutual funds and everybody else in the market place. It also means a tilt in the playing field for those who don’t have the information or have the access to the speed or big enough to play in this game.”

In 2013, Warren, together with Senators John McCain, Maria Cantwell and Angus King, introduced the “21st Century Glass-Steagall Act.” Warren explained why the legislation is critically needed:

“By separating traditional depository banks from riskier financial institutions,” said Warren, “the 1933 version of Glass-Steagall laid the groundwork for half a century of financial stability. During that time, we built a robust and thriving middle class. But throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, Congress and regulators chipped away at Glass-Steagall’s protections, encouraging growth of the megabanks and a sharp increase in systemic risk. They finally finished the task in 1999 with the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which eliminated Glass-Steagall’s protections altogether.”

Nine years later, the financial system crashed, leaving the economy in the worst condition since the Great Depression.  Warren and Wall Street

Elizabeth Warren Against Corruption

Interest Rates and Deflation

Carmen Reinhart writes:   For the 189 countries for which data are available, median inflation for 2015 is running just below 2%, slightly lower than in 2014 and, in most cases, below the International Monetary Fund’s projections.

Most of the other half are not doing badly, either. In the period following the oil shocks of the 1970s until the early 1980s, almost two-thirds of the countries recorded inflation rates above 10%. According to the latest data, which runs through July or August for most countries, there are “only” 14 cases of high inflation (the red line in the figure). Venezuela (which has not published official inflation statistics this year) and Argentina (which has not released reliable inflation data for several years) figure prominently in this group. Iran, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, and a handful of African countries comprise the rest.

The risk for the world economy is actually tilted toward deflation for the 23 advanced economies in the sample, even eight years after the onset of the global financial crisis. For this group, the median inflation rate is 0.2% – the lowest since 1933.

While we do not know what might have happened were policies different, one can easily imagine that, absent quantitative easing in the United States, Europe, and Japan, those economies would have been mired in a deflationary post-crisis landscape akin to that of the 1930s.

Falling prices mean a rise in the real value of existing debts and an increase in the debt-service burden, owing to higher real interest rates. As a result, defaults, bankruptcies, and economic decline become more likely, putting further downward pressures on prices.

The  2.2% price decline in Greece for the 12 months ending in July – the most severe example of ongoing deflation in the advanced countries and counterproductive to an orderly solution to the country’s problems.

Median inflation rates for emerging-market and developing economies, which were in double digits through the mid-1990s, are now around 2.5% and falling. The sharp declines in oil and commodity prices during the latest supercycle have helped mitigate inflationary pressures, while the generalized slowdown in economic activity in the emerging world may have contributed as well.

But it is too early to conclude that inflation is a problem of the past, because other external factors are working in the opposite direction.

Given that most emerging-market countries’ trade is conducted in dollars, currency depreciation should push up import prices almost one for one.

At the end of the day, the US Federal Reserve will base its interest-rate decisions primarily on domestic considerations. While there is more than the usual degree of uncertainty regarding the magnitude of America’s output gap since the financial crisis, there is comparatively less ambiguity now that domestic inflation is subdued. The rest of the world shares that benign inflation environment.

Deflation